Issue

The Department of Defense (DoD) Public Key Enabling (PKE) team and the DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Program Management Office (PMO) have received several reports from DoD services about DoD certificates chaining improperly to root Certification Authorities (CAs) other than the DoD root. User certificate chains on workstations experiencing this issue may look similar to the following:

When this occurs on DoD systems, PKI validation does not work properly and may result in the following:

a) DoD user denied access to DoD web sites
b) DoD signed emails in Microsoft Outlook appear invalid
c) DoD users experience extensive delays with Outlook or Internet Explorer during validation
d) DoD users receive a prompt to install the Common Policy or other Federal Bridge cross-certified root CAs when opening a signed email of a DoD sender whose workstation is misconfigured

Discussion

Several scenarios can cause a workstation to experience this problem. Due to DoD information sharing initiatives with Federal and commercial partners, cross-certificates are essential for our partners to be able to validate DoD credentials but can cause problems on DoD systems when one or more of the following conditions exist:

a) When the DoD PKI CA certificates are not installed locally in the correct locations, Microsoft CAPI will attempt to build a path to a known issuer (e.g., Common Policy) and will automatically install cross-certificates obtained during path-processing into the user trust store. In addition to an incorrect or failed path, this can also cause significant delays.

b) When valid certificate chains exist to both the DoD Root CA and other root CAs cross-certified with the Federal Bridge (e.g. Common Policy), Microsoft will prefer the path with more information, which typically will be the longer path through the bridge. This situation can be exacerbated by:

- Microsoft’s Root Update Service being enabled, causing Microsoft to automatically add root CAs including several Federal Bridge members (e.g. Common Policy) to the local computer Trusted Root store. This can pose a significant security risk and is a Windows Operating System Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) violation.

- A DoD user receiving a signed message from a misconfigured workstation; Microsoft Outlook will send the entire undesired certificate chain (e.g. from DoD end user up to Common Policy) in the S/MIME payload, causing the recipient to be prompted to install the non-DoD trust anchor. The user’s workstation will then have a Federal Bridge member CA in its trust store, and prefer paths built to that external CA rather than those stopping at the DoD root.

When trying to validate an end entity certificate, Microsoft CAPI will attempt to select the best quality chain leading up to a certificate that the user trusts. Where multiple valid chains exist, this may not be the shortest chain found (normally DoD Root CA → DoD Issuing CA → DoD user). CAPI starts by calculating the “quality” of each chain. Microsoft derives the quality of the chain from a number of factors. If a chain provides more information (i.e. valid policy constraints, name constraints) its quality increases; conversely, if it encounters errors (certificate is revoked / revocation status unknown, invalid name constraints) its quality decreases. Once these factors are evaluated,

**Recommendation**

1. Administrators should run the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) Cross-Certificate Removal Tool once as an administrator and once as the current user. The tool is available from the DoD PKE site at http://iase.disa.mil/pki-pke under **Tools > Certificate Validation**. Among other things, the tool moves the Interoperability CA (IRCA) \( \rightarrow \) DoD Root CA 2 certificate to Microsoft’s Untrusted Certificates store, which makes the local machine treat that certificate as revoked. This prevents the machine from building paths from DoD end entity certificates to roots outside of the DoD PKI, while still allowing paths to be built from other federal bridge members back to a DoD Interoperability Root CA trust anchor (when present in the trust store). Putting the cross-certificate in the Untrusted store provides a permanent fix, as opposed to simply removing it from the trusted CAs store, which leaves open the potential that the certificate could be automatically re-installed during Microsoft path building in the future.

2. DoD root and subordinate/intermediate CA certificates should be installed on all DoD systems in the appropriate locations. Administrators should use InstallRoot or another approved method of distribution such as Group Policy Object (GPO). This will prevent Microsoft from needing to build a path to an external known issuer due to the DoD root being unknown.

3. In Microsoft Outlook Email Security settings, the “Send these certificates with signed messages” check box should be unchecked. This will cause only the end entity signing and encryption certificates, rather than the full certificate chains, to be sent with signed messages.

4. Microsoft’s Root Update service should be disabled on all DoD systems (through GPO when possible) to prevent Common Policy and other certificates from being automatically added to the local computer trusted root store.

5. Web server administrators with users experiencing denial-of-service due to this issue should explore options for forcing the web server to discard the presented certificate chain and attempting to build a valid path from the end user certificate on the server side. The Trust Anchor Constraints Tool (TACT), available from the DoD PKE site at http://iase.disa.mil/pki-pke under **Tools > Certificate Validation**, is one such option.